A Better Cost-Sharing Option for State Flood Mitigation Programs
There are those at FEMA, as well as we at ASFPM, who are concerned states are not spending all the funding allocated through the various mitigation programs like HMGP, BRIC and FMA; which we fear will lead Congress to reduce future mitigation funding. But there’s a reason some states haven’t spent all of their funding, and it’s not because they don’t need it. It’s the inability to add staff.
Some people have asked, “Why don’t states raise taxes and fees to provide a base level of staffing for state mitigation staff to help locals do mitigation planning and apply for mitigation grants?”
States are often unable to add permanent mitigation staff to run these programs because agency leaders or state legislators want to have some assurance of continued funding before approving positions. Instead, many states depend on management costs to fund their state mitigation programs. The management costs associated with disaster mitigation funding are not a stable source of funding. They can vary widely from year to year and, if a state goes a few years between disasters, there is no staff funding. Nor are management costs timely. So states are often faced with hiring temporary or project employees, or contractors which, while helpful short term, does not lead to better long-term capability to manage statewide mitigation programs or provide long-term assistance or training to locals.
How we got here
Let me provide some history on this issue. Around the turn of the century (1900 that is) locals and property owners bore the cost of disasters; sometimes with help from donations. That is how it was with the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927. Since then, Congress has used federal taxpayer funds for many of the activities around disasters, especially response, but lately also for mitigation.
Mitigation should be a local/state/federal partnership, but since the 1950’s Congress has continued to increase the amount of federal taxpayer funding for these activities. This is ironic since it is the states and locals who permit development and are allowing more development in high-risk areas. They do this because they gain the tax dollars off the real estate and experience has taught them that, if a disaster occurs, federal taxpayers will cover most of the cost—and the bigger the disaster, the more the federal taxpayer will cover (up to 90% or even 100%). It is a perverse system, but members of Congress see it as a way to bring home the bacon and get re-elected.
The disaster response and recovery system should have incentives for communities, who, like Charlotte-Mecklenburg in North Carolina, take local action to reduce risky development. But the system now operates exactly the opposite; the more development at risk and thus the larger the disaster, the more the federal taxpayers will pay. Char-Meck leaders have figured out (with help from their great staff) that in the long term, their citizens will not only save money but will be much safer if there is less development at risk — especially as climate change and watershed development increase the risk. As you may recall, Char-Meck determines flood levels based on future development in the watershed, which raises the flood levels from 2 feet to 9 feet. The community leaders decided to develop to those higher flood levels because they want new development to avoid flooding after they build.
As explained above, some locals and states see that Congress (read: U.S. taxpayers) will pick up the disaster costs while allowing states and locals to keep the real estate taxes — the current system is a simple win/win for many states and locals. To counter this trend, former FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate proposed a disaster deductible during the Obama administration to incentivize increased risk reduction actions at the state and local levels, but it went nowhere in Congress or in the next administration. And it apparently will go nowhere until Congress gets smart or the feds go broke.
A smarter approach
The best example of encouraging the states to spend some money on building long-term state capability to help communities manage flood risk is the CAP-SSSE program in the NFIP. It cost shares (25% state share) long-term funding for state staff to work on NFIP assistance, training, and compliance. Since it is a stable, timely, and long-term cost sharing program, state agencies have a much easier time gaining approval for permanent state staff for flood risk management. Over time, states see this as a long-term benefit in managing flood risk; locals tell the legislatures that state staff help them comply with NFIP and guide them with assistance on their maps, regulations, and mitigation. Thus, state agencies can convince state legislatures to be open to increasing this activity, even above the cost-share limit. Without this consistent source of funding, most state FPM programs would not have added staff to help locals manage flood risk.
This assistance can also be particularly effective in helping economically and socially disadvantaged communities. Who better to know and understand the unique concerns and hurdles of communities in a state than state staff? We have observed time and again that when a state has a robust staff to help with floodplain management or hazard mitigation issues, they are very effective in helping with project applications, project implementation, training, and outreach and can do it to support many more communities than the approach that many seem to be advocating, which is direct technical assistance from FEMA.
Simply based on the numbers of communities with needs versus available staff and resources, direct programs of technical assistance by a federal agency to communities will always be of very limited success. In a nation with more than 22,000 flood-prone communities, success is not defined by helping a dozen or two of them.
This article is an effort to explain why ASFPM is pushing for a new approach, which is cost-sharing program for state mitigation staff similar to the CAP program in NFIP. Comments welcome at Larry@floods.org.
